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REFUSAL TO SELL
VERNON A. MU'ND*
Today, the business practice of refusal to sell is one of the principal
antitrust complaints. However, paradoxically, it is a complaint which
receives practically the least amount of attention and relief. Typically,
the antitrust agencies treat reports on refusal to sell with the general-
ized reply that "the seller has the right to choose his own customers."
The very number of complaints, however, as well as an economic
analysis of the practice itself, points to the need for a re-evaluation
of this business practice and for a re-appraisal of the currently appli-
cable judicial decisions.
As we shall see in the present study, the evidence on refusal to sell
indicates that the practice exists mainly as a feature of our "big busi-
ness" economy in which large corporations controlling a substantial
part of the supply of certain goods are able to gain by refusing to sell
to some buyers. To the extent that our business structure is not
modified by dissolution, divorcement, and divestiture proceedings, it
is possible that public policy will move more and more in the direction
of scrutinizing and regulating this present-day business conduct in
the public interest. Increasingly, therefore, it is suggested, attention
will center on the economic problem of refusal to sell.
Refusal to Sell in Free and Open Markets
The economic basis or norm historically followed by the courts and
Congress in regulating business is found in the kind of competition
which prevails in central and primary markets. It is in these markets
that competition typically operates openly and spontaneously. The
very number of traders tends to prevent collusion. Market prices are
not "administered," but are crystallized by a balancing of the forces
of demand and supply. They are made impersonally by market forces.
Market prices also are nondiscriminatory; each seller, as a rule, cur-
rently treats his customers alike. It is competition of this kind which
Congress had in mind when it enacted the Sherman Act, as well as
the Federal Trade Commission, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts.'
Such competition, it may be noted, is neither pure nor perfect. It is
rather best described as "effective" or "workable" competition, a kind
of practically-attainable competition which actually exists or which
can, in fact, be brought into operation in many segments of our busi-
ness economy by appropriate public policy.
* Professor of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington
1. 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (daily ed. April 8, 1890); 51 id. 16145 (daily ed. Oct. 5,
1914); MuxD, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 88 (1955).
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As a basis for appraising refusal to sell, we may ask, does this prac-
tice exist in our central and primary markets? Is it a common feature
of competitive market selling? Is refusal to sell an attribute of "the
free-market ideal," as is frequently declared in current legal litera-
ture?2
In order to determine the operation of refusal to sell as a business
practice in genuinely competitive markets, the writer conducted an
extensive survey of: (1) the principal exchange markets for wheat,
corn, oats, rye, soybeans, flaxseed, grain sorghums, cotton, wool, wool
tops, butter, eggs, potatoes, mill feeds, cottonseed oil, soybean oil,
lard, cottonseed meal, and soybean meal; (2) the national securities
markets; (3) the central markets for livestock; and (4) the principal
shipping-point, central, and terminal markets for the major agricul-
tural products.3
Upon the basis of personal investigations and questionnaire surveys,
the following generalizations can be stated:
1. In central markets-such as the commodity exchanges, spot mar-
kets, and. securities markets-sellers always stand ready to sell at a
price whenever inventories are available and ready payment is offered.
2. Buyers always have a choice of sellers with the opportunity to
buy at prices determined by the forces of supply and demand.
3. A seller treats all of his buyers equally at any given time. The
only selection of customers is in regard to the financial standing of
prospective buyers. Commodities move to the highest bidders on an
impersonal basis.
4. As a general rule, there are no examples of refusal to sell if the
price is satisfactory and if the buyer is financially responsible.
5. In rare situations, a seller may be motivated by reasons of senti-
ment and refuse to sell for non-economic, personal reasons. A pros-
pective buyer in this situation is denied a desired purchase, but he is
not typically denied access to market supplies.
6. Instances of refusal to sell in open, competitive central markets
indicate that this business practice may develop, and has developed,
as follows:
(a) On the commodity and securities exchanges, brokers (repre-
senting a principal) have sometimes sought to play favorites by
refusing to sell to the highest bidder or by refusing to buy at the
lowest price. To remedy this element of favoritism, all of the ex-
changes have adopted some rule providing that sales must be made
competitively and that contracts cannot be held for a specific person.
2. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 134 (1955).




The first and best bid, or the first bid at the asking price, must pre-
vail. All orders to buy or sell must be executed competitively by
open outcry.
(b) Arbitrary refusals to sell have been found to exist in central
markets as a result of concerted action among sellers.4 Here the
practice operates not only to deny some buyers the opportunity to
purchase, but also to deny them access to market supplies, either
completely or partially.
7. In open markets, sellers have the right to hold for their asking
prices. They have a right, also, to choose only those customers who
offer ready and assured payment. But if there is a meeting of minds
on price and if the terms of sale are met, refusal to sell does not occur
among commercial sellers.
Refusal to Sell as a Business Practice
Refusal to sell, it should be noted, is not concerned with the right
of a property owner as such, to sell or not to sell. It is rather a market
phenomenon. It describes a form of business conduct which is some-
times practiced by a seller (or a unified group of sellers) controlling
a large part of the total market supply of certain goods.
How, it may be asked, can a commercial seller enhance his profit
returns by refusing to sell? Refusal to sell typically means a refusal
to sell to some buyers in the same market offering to meet the terms
of sale available to others. It is a practice of discriminating among
buyers-by selling to some and at the same time not selling to others.
The money gain which can be secured by this kind of treatment arises
in the fact that the buyers denied the right to buy are, as a result,
typically denied market supplies, either completely or partially, so
that they are prevented or hindered in competition with other pro-
ducers who are able to buy.
This aspect of refusal to sell flows from its exercise by a seller (or
a unified group of sellers) which controls a large part of the total
market supply, so that persons denied supplies have no realistic, suf-
ficiently available, alternative sources of supply, completely inter-
changeable in use. Refusal to sell is thus an exclusive-or exclusionary
-practice which compels some buyers in a given market to restrict
their productive activity in relation to other buyers in that market.
Competition is thereby lessened between those to whom the goods
are sold and those denied supplies.
Some Concrete Examples of Refusal to Sell
A study of antitrust complaints on refusal to sell indicates that the
practice arises in market situations in which one or a few producers
4. See In re Alexander, Conover and Co., P. and S. Docket No. 300 (1931).
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control all or a large part of the supply of certain goods. Its use rests
upon (1) unified action among sellers in a given market, or (2) control
of such a large fraction of the supply by one or a few sellers that a
seller (or sellers) can refuse to sell to some buyers and thereby, in
fact, deny them access to market supplies. The test on size is whether
the refusal has the effect of compelling some would-be buyers to
restrict their business activity, either partially or completely, in rela-
tion to others in the same market.
1. Refusal to sell is practiced in the sale of certain basic standardized
commodities such as steel, copper, lead, zinc, and cement-wherein
the supply is controlled by a few large corporations which seek to
strengthen their management of price by denying supplies to
merchant-dealers, central distributors, and speculators.
In American industry, the problem of refusal to sell had its origin in
the markets for iron, steel, and the nonferrous metals. Until the latter
part of the nineteenth" century, independent dealers and distributors,
operating warehouses at central points, largely performed the work
of distributing metal products to the consuming industries. Primary
producers sold freely to these middlemen who also served as a balance-
wheel in buying when consumer demands were low for resale during
periods of advancing demand. With the formation of mergers (1896-
1903), and the adoption of delivered pricing systems, however, primary
producers found these middlemen a source of troublesome competition.
In order to curb "free" supplies, therefore, the primary producers
adopted a policy of refusing to sell to independent merchants, specu-
lators, and persons dealing on the metal exchanges. In large measure,
the new policy became one of selling directly to consuming industries
and to local dealers and jobbers for distribution to buyers desiring
less than carload lots.
5
2. Refusal to sell is practiced by some large integrated corporations,
producing both primary and fabricated products, in making prefer-
ences in sales to their own fabricating plants or subsidiaries, or to
large consumers having long-term purchase commitments, thereby
foreclosing the spot market in various degrees to nonintegrated
fabricators, converters, and commercial users.
An economic problem of growing importance is the extent to which
first-hand producers should be permitted to control fabricating facili-
5. A vivid picture of the revolutionary change in American marketing
methods which occurred with the formation of mergers is found in the Annual
Report of the New York Metal Exchange for 1922-23. For details on the
exclusion of nonconsuming trade interests in the zinc and cement industries,
see Engineering and Mining Journal, Aug. 11, 1928, p. 234. See also Transcript




ties which are in direct competition with their customers. Three evils
in particular are widely reported. One is the complaint that during
periods of short supply the large integrated mills refuse to sell supplies
of raw material to non-integrated fabricators at mill (carload) prices.
Another is the allegation that during periods of excess supply the
integrated companies cut prices-and profit margins-on fabricated
products without reducing prices on the primary materials which the
nonintegrated fabricators must buy. Still another is the complaint
that the continuing growth of vertical mergers, particularly in steel,
is causing more and more of the basic products to move to captive
fabricators. A problem facing independent fabricators, in steel, it is
reported, is that of being able to obtain steel at all.
6
3. Refusal to sell is practiced by some producers of basic standard-
ized products in a plan of confining the resale market to dealers or
industrial users classified as "legitimate," "ethical," "preferred,"
"selected," or "desirable."
A policy of channeling the sale of basic standardized products
through "selected" dealers or users is followed by producers in a
number of industries. In such instances, prospective enterprisers are
not free to follow an occupation of their own choice. They must be
"good" or "ethical" in the eyes of the primary producer. In one case,
for example, the president of a leading cement company was asked
"Do you sell to everyone who represents himself to be a dealer?" He
replied, "Well, we look into the situation and try to decide whether
or not it would be a profitable outlet for us-a good distributor, a good
dealer, a good connection-a great many things bear on the situation. '7
4. Refusal to sell arises in the control of all or a large part of the
supply of a basic standardized product by a single producer and the
foreclosure of the market to all others.
Today, examples of market pre-emption and foreclosure usually
arise when local plants producing basic products, such as steel or
wood pulp, are acquired by large fabricating companies. In such cases
local supplies may be completely denied to independent, nonintegrated
fabricators. 8
5. A significant aspect of the economic problem of refusal to sell
arises when an integrated producer or a unified group of producers
6. See Mund, The Right to Buy, S. Doc. No. 32, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-53,
89-90 (1957); Hearings Before the Senate Special Committee to Study Prob-
lems of American Small Business, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 1744-45
(1947).
7. Transcript of Record, p. 30148-49, Cement Institute v. FTC, 157 F.2d 533
(7th Cir. 1946).
8. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 6, at 840-42.
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refuses to sell a basic product to independents during a sellers'
market wherein price is managed and does not rise to exclude certain
buyers.
A sellers' market is one in which demand exceeds supply at current
prices. Ordinarily, competition among buyers operates to increase
the price to a level at which all those wishing to buy at that price can
do so. But when prices are administered, prices do not rise with buy-
ers', competition. Instead, unfilled orders develop, and primary pro-
ducers allocate short supplies by rationing, by refusing to sell, and
by priority ratings of their own choice.
6. Refusal to sell is used by some suppliers as a device for restricting
entry or eliminating price competition in resale markets.
Refusal to sell has been widely used by suppliers as a device for
fixing prices in the resale market. Some manufacturers seek to peg
final prices at higher levels to provide generous profits for distributors.
This helps to reduce pressure on them for lower mill prices. It also
serves to encourage a wide distribution of their products. In some
instances high-markup dealers themselves bring pressure on suppliers
to fix resale prices and to deny supplies to rivals who are or might be
competitive on price. The range of examples of coercion by third
parties to have supplies denied to rivals is wide and includes refusal
to sell made by a supplier under pressure from a trade union to deny
supplies to a prospective buyer.
7. Refusal to sell may arise when a seller, controlling a substantial
amount of the sales of a certain good in a given market area, seeks
to exclude or hinder competitors in his line of business, by requiring
customers to accept tie-in deals, exclusive dealing arrangements,
and full-line forcing contracts.
A common complaint received by the antitrust agencies is that a
particular supplier refuses to sell, or has discontinued selling, because
the dealer or retailer is handling a competing line of products or be-
cause he will not buy other lines or materials produced by the seller.
Tie-in arrangements take many forms and refusal to sell serves as the
main device for making them effective.
8. Refusal to sell is sometimes employed in the sale of manufactured
specialities: (a) in final form for consumer use (e.g., silverware),
and (b) in form for sale to final customers (e.g., farm machinery) in
a policy of selling only to "selected" dealers, franchised dealers,
direct dealers or exclusive territorial dealers.
Some manufacturers employ a policy of distributing their products
through selected sales outlets rather than selling freely to all comers.
[VOL.. 11
REFUSAL TO SELL
Their desire is to confine sales to the most profitable outlets, to provide
standards for sales and service and to secure an observance of resale
prices or exclusive-dealing arrangements. In selecting a distributor
it is common practice to provide him with a franchise. Whenever a
manufacturer believes that a selected dealer is failing to promote sales,
is handling competing products, or is engaged in price cutting, he typi-
cally employs the disciplinary action of refusal to sell.
Summarizing the foregoing situations in which refusal to sell is
found to prevail, it may be said that the practice reflects for the most
-part deliberate commercial action to gain profit by excluding certain
buyers. It is not an expression of the free-market ideal in which a
trader is free to sell or not to sell at the current market price.- Its use
as a commercial device rests upon control over all or a large part of
the supply of a certain market good. With such control a seller is in
a position to deny supplies to some persons and enhance profits in
other outlets for the persons denied supplies are restrained in competi-
tion with the favored buyers.
Refusal to Sell in Anglo-Saxon Law
Our national economic policy of competition had its origin in the
English common law on markets and freedom of enterprise.9 In the
English law, the right of a person to follow an occupation of his own
choice, without interference or dictation by other producers or by
government, was frequently declared.10 As a concomitant right, the
English judges also declared the right of all persons to come to a cen-
tral market and buy, or sell, under the same conditions possible to
others."
The right to compete, which has become known as "freedom of
enterprise" or "freedom of competition," stands today as a main
pillar in our national economic policy. Neither the antitrust agencies
nor the courts would act to stifle it. Yet, the right to compete is only
a symbol unless an enterpriser is cal5able of competing--that is, able
economically to have access to commodities in the same full measure
as anyone else. The right to buy, as a market right superior to a com-
mercial seller's right to deny supplies, is essential if the right to com-
pete is to be made meaningful.
9. In the debate on the Sherman Act (1890), Senator Hoar stated: "The
great thing that this bill does, except affording a remedy, is to extend the
common-law principles, which protected fair competition in trade in old
times in England, to international and interstate commerce in the United
States." 21 CONG. REc. 3152 (daily ed. April 8, 1890).
10. Ipswich Tailors' Case, 11 Co. Rep. 53a,. 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614);
Colgate v. Bacheler, Cro. Eliz: 872, 78 Eng. Rep. 1079 (Q.B. 1601); Case of
John Dyer, Y.B. 2 Henry V, f. 5, pL- 5b (1414); The Schoolmaster's'Case, Y.B.
Henry IV, f. 47, pl. 21 (1410).
11. Mayor of Northampton v. Ward, 2 Strange 1239, 93 Eng." Rep, - 1155
(K.B. 1745); Harrison v. Rock, 1 Benl. 160, 73 Eng. Rep. 1025 (K.B. 1626);
Austin v. Whittred, Willes 623, 125 Eng. Rep. 1353 (C.P. 1746).
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In making effective the early English law declaring the "liberty
of buying and selling," the English courts repeatedly held that persons
in business, holding themselves out to the public as sellers, had a posi-
tive obligation to serve all comers.
12
A person engaged in a given trade, as a business, was held to be in a
common employment and subject to the duty of serving all. It is
frequently said that the term "common" in the early English law was
applied only to certain trades-mainly those which had some degree of
monopoly power-as those of innkeepers, ferrymen, and carriers.
Available evidence, however, has given substantial support for the
conclusion that the word "common" was used to designate not certain
businesses but rather all which were conducted as a business.13 A
"private" blacksmith or tailor was one who worked privately for a
particular employer. Such a person could not be called upon to
serve all. But if any tradesmen-a merchant, dealer, barber, smith,
or baker-held himself out to the public as a seller, he had a definite
obligation to serve all. Cases on refusal to sell were specifically prose-
cuted as an illegal act.
Persons in business under the common law not only had the obliga-
tion to serve all comers but also in some instances had the further
obligation to serve at reasonable prices. This additional obligation
applied to situations in which fewness of sellers gave rise to monopolis-
tic power. A ferry operated as a business, for example, was declared
by Chief Justice Hale to be "a thing of public interest and use."
14
So, likewise, a public wharf was held to be "[a]ffected with a public
interest," and was required to serve with reasonable tolls.15
As is well known, the doctrine of "affected with a public interest"
was introduced into American law in the case of Munn v. Illinois.
16
The condition of "virtual monopoly" thereupon became the basis for
imposing price control, as well as the obligation to serve all would-be
customers. In the fields of manufacturing, mining and merchandising,
the American courts did not use and apply the early English doctrine
of common employments. The application of this doctrine in England,
moreover, appears to have lost its significance with the removal of
mercantile restrictions and the triumph of Adam Smith's "freedom of
competition. '17
12. Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. L. REV. 135, 152-54 (1914).
13. Mund, The Right to Buy, S. Doc. No. 32, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1957).
14. Hale, De Jure Marls, in 1 HARGRAVE LAW TRACTS 6 (1787).
15. Hale, De Portibus Mars, in 1 HARGRAVE LAW TRACTS 77-78 (1787).
16. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
17. .As late as 1701, the English courts gave recognition to the doctrine that
a person in business has the obligation to serve all comers. In Lane v. Cotton,
1 Ld. Raym. 646, 654, 91 Eng. Rep. 1332, 1336 (K.B. 1701), Chief Justice Holt
declared: "If a man takes upon him a public employment, he is bound to
serve the public as far as the employment extends; and for refusal an action
lies, as against a farrier refusing to shoe a horse, against an innkeeper refusing
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The very number of enterprisers in the United States, as well as in
England, and the general freedom of enterprise provided for a wide-
spread freedom of access to goods and services. The spirit of laissez-
faire became dominant in legal thought, and the American courts
adopted the general view of a "hands off" policy toward business.'8
When cases of refusal to sell did arise, the courts, with their laissez-
faire philosophy and without historical inquiry or market analysis,
looked to the rights of private property and declared that "refusal to
sell" in general business is an inherent right. Today the problem
faced is that of re-examining this legal doctrine in light of the vast
changes which have taken place in business structure and corporate
organization.
Legislative Action to Curb Refusal to Sell
The formation of large mergers during the period 1900-1912, par-
ticularly in iron, steel, and the nonferrous metals, brought about
many changes in the markets for these products. Open competitive
selling to all comers in central markets was largely replaced by the
making of direct sales to consuming industries at delivered prices
only, with a denial of supplies to merchant-dealers, central distributors,
and speculators. Complaints on refusal to sell, together with those of
geographic price discrimination, brought demands in Congress for
relief. In a bill introduced by Congressman Henry D. Clayton on
April 14, 191419 condemning price discrimination, it was provided:
It shall be unlawful for the owner or operator of any mine engaged in
selling its product in commerce to refuse arbitrarily to sell the same to a
responsible person, firm, or corporation who applies to purchase.
As reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary on May 6,
191420 this provision was changed to read as follows:
Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful for the owner or operator of any mine
or for any person controlling the product of any mine engaged in selling
its product in commerce to refuse arbitrarily to sell such product to a
responsible person, firm, or corporation who applies to purchase such
product for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
Territory thereof ....
According to the Report of the Judiciary Committee, section 3 of the
bill made it
a guest, when he has a room, against a carrier refusing to carry goods, when
he has convenience, his wagon not being full."
18. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 138 (1948).
19. H.R. 15657, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1914).
20. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
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unlawful for the owner or operator of a mine, or the person controlling
the sale of the product thereof in commerce, to arbitrarily refuse to sell
such product to a responsible person who-applies to purchase the same ....
The section is based on the broad conservation idea that natural products
such as iron, coal, and other minerals stored in the earth as a result of
nature's laws should not be monopolized by the mere acquisition of the
title to the lands which contain such resources. 21
The House report noted that this provision was new,
but in view of the fact that many railroad corporations, the United States
Steel Corporation, and other corporations have acquired and own, either
directly or indirectly, through the medium of subsidiary corporations,
vast areas of land containing coal, iron, and copper and other minerals in
common use, we feel that this legislation is needed and fully justified. By
its enactment into law we make it impossible for mere ownership of mines
to enable the owners or those disposing of the products thereof to direct
the disposal of such products into monopolistic channels of trade ....
The section expressly forbids the mine owner or person controlling the
sale of the product of the mine to arbitrarily refuse to sell such product
to any responsible purchaser, and thereby prevents the mine owner or
operator from giving the preference to another and rival dealer in the
disposal of such product.22
The minority view on the proposed compulsory-sales provision, as
reported on May 12, 1914,2 in the main was as follows:
This is a new and important invasion of business liberty. By this section
a mine owner is deprived of a natural right to sell his product where and
to whom he may. The mine owner is put upon the same basis as a public-
service corporation . . . under this law, a mine owner is forbidden to
select his own customers, although this right is carefully preserved with
regard to every other business by the language of the proposed law.
Further, on May 13, 1914,24 the minority members of the Judiciary
Committee declared:
This bill apparently permits trusts arbitrarily to refuse to sell to
persons whom they wish to crush, except in reference to the products of
mines .... Why should the products of mines be thus singled out? If
this is a sound principle, why should it not be applied generally as to all
commodities, or at least as to all raw materials which are required in the
production of other commodities?
This section is open to the further criticism that the language employed
is vague and indefinite. To convict an owner or operator of any mine, or
any person controlling the product of any mine under this section, it is
necessary to prove that he "arbitrarily" refused to sell such product "to a
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1914).
24. Id., pt. 3.
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responsible person, firm,- or corporation."- -The use of the words "arbi-
trarily" and "responsible" affords loopholes which may make it difficult
to prosecute-anyone successfully.
As agreed upon in the House on June 2, 1914, the proposed legislation
was recast to read as follows:
That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling
goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own
customers, except as provided in section three of this Act.
Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful for the owner, operator, or transporter
of the product or products of any mine, oil or gas well, reduction works,
refinery, or hydroelectric plant producing coal, oil, gas, or hydro-electric
energy, or for any person controlling the products thereof, engaged in
selling such product in commerce to refuse arbitrarily to sell such product
to a responsible person, firm, or corporation who applies to purchase such
product for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession
or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and any person
violating this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be punished as provided in the preceding section.
The Senate Report of July 22, 1914,2 stated that it was the proposed
Senate amendment to strike out section 3 of the House bill
because, in the opinion of the committee, it would be unwise to enact
such legislation as is contained in it. It would, primarily, deny freedom
of contract to one of the parties, and consequently would be of doubtful
constitutional validity. Passing from -this consideration, the Committee
believe that such an enactment, which would practically compel owners
of the products named to sell to anyone or else decline to do so at the
peril of incurring heavy penalties, would project us into a field of legis-
lation at once untried, complicated and dangerous.
As passed by the Senate on August 25, 1914, the Clayton bill did not
contain a specific provision relating to arbitrary refusals in the sale of
products of "any mine, oil or gas well, reduction works, refinery, or
hydro-electric plant." Instead, the bill provided and became law with
the general statement: "And provided further, that nothing herein
contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or
merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in
bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade."26 In explaining
this proviso, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated that "the
limitation is made by amendment that the selection must be 'in
bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade,' which will enforce
good faith and prevent restraint of trade by this method."
2 7
25. S. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
26. 38 STAT. 730-31 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952).
27. See note 25 supra.
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Selection of Customers Condemned When
in Restraint of Trade
The action taken by Congress in 1914 condemns refusal to sell when
"in restraint of trade." The evidence at hand indicates that refusal to
sell as a business practice and as widely and presently used is in re-
straint of trade. Its usual effect and result are to restrain the trade
of the persons denied supplies in relation to those to whom goods are
sold.
Basic questions for the antitrust agencies and injured persons to ask
in using the Clayton Act 28 would appear to be: "Does a would-be buyer,
denied essential supplies of a standard product, have realistic, suffi-
ciently available, alternative supplies, interchangeable in use?" "Are
some would-be buyers compelled to restrict their business activity
partially or completely?" "Is the trade (the business) of the person
denied supplies restrained in relation to those to whom goods are
sold?"
The American Courts and Refusal To Sell
The doctrine on refusal to sell basically followed today in the United
States is that a seller may refuse to sell to any person for any reason
satisfactory to himself, so long as this is the result of his own independ-
ent judgment and is not in restraint of trade or otherwise in violation
of law.
The foregoing interpretation of the law has been made by the
United States Supreme Court in a series of cases beginning with
United States v. Colgate & Co.,29 and continuing through FTC v. Ray-
mond Bros.-Clark Co.,3 0 and Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States.31
In the Times-Picayune case, the Court declared:
Refusals to sell, without more, do not violate the law. Though group
boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal, clearly run afoul of § 1 [Sherman
Act] . . . different criteria have long applied to qualify the rights of an
individual seller. Beginning with United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300 (1919), this Court's decisions have recognized individual refusals
to sell as a general right, though "neither absolute nor exempt from regu-
lation." Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951). If
accompanied by unlawful conduct or agreement, or conceived in monop-
olistic purpose or market control, even individual sellers' refusals to deal
have transgressed the Act. Lorain Journal v. United States, supra;
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721-723 (1944);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375
(1927); United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920) .... 32
28. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952).
29. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
30. 263 U.S. 565 (1924).
31. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
32. Id. at 625.
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In United States v. Colgate & Co., which serves as a landmark in
the law on refusal to sell, Justice McReynolds stated:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
[Sherman] does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manu-
facturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to sell.34
As authority for this rule, Justice McReynolds cited United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,35 in which Justice Peckham commented
that: "The trader or manufacturer, on the other hand, carries on an
entirely private business, and can sell to whom he pleases. '36 Justice
Peckham, it may be noted, gave no supporting reference for this state-
ment.
The doctrine that a seller can refuse to sell found recognition in
the state courts as early as 1891. In Delz v. Winfree,37 the court con-
ceded that the following proposition made by the appellee was correct:
"A person has an absolute right to refuse to have business relations
with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal is based upon rea-
son, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice, and there
is no law which forces a man to part with his title to his property."
Here again, no supporting reference or citation was given. '
A leading state case on refusal to sell was that of Locker v. American
Tobacco Co. 39 In this decision, the court said:
It is the well-settled law of this state that the refusal to maintain trade
relations with any individual is an inherent right which every person may
exercise lawfully, for reasons he deems sufficient or for no reasons what-
ever; and it is immaterial whether such refusal is based upon reason or
is the result of mere caprice, prejudice, or malice. It is a part of the
liberty of action which the Constitutions, state and federal, guarantee to
the citizen. It is not within the power of the courts to compel an owner
of property to sell or part with his title to it, without his consent, and
against his wishes, to any particular persons.40
Again, it may be noted, the court gave no reference or supporting case
for this opinion.
In the Cream of Wheat case41 (1915), the court of appeals, in affirm-
33. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
34. Id. at 307.
35. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
36. Id. at 320.
37. 80 Tex. 400, 16 S.W. 111 (1891).
38. Id. at 112.
39. 121 App. Div. 443, 106 N.Y. Supp 115 (2d Dep't 1907), 88 N.E. 289 (1909).
40. 106 N.Y. Supp. at 121.




ing the right of the company to select its own customers, declared:
"We had supposed that it was elementary law that a trader could buy
from whom he pleased and sell to whom he pleased, and that his selec-
tion of seller and buyer was wholly his own concern."42 As authority
for this view, the Court cited "Cooley on Torts, p. 278." 43 At the refer-
ence given, Professor Cooley states, "It is a part of every man's civil
rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations with any
person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is the
result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice." 44
An Appraisal of the Current Legal Doctrine on Refusal to Sell
The Delz, Locker, Cream of Wheat, and Colgate cases asserted the
right of a trader to refuse to sell upon a consideration of the rights of
private property and free citizens. Since the date of these decisions,
the courts have come to regard refusal to sell as a basic feature of a
free-enterprise economy. Mr. Charles F. Barber summarizes this view
as follows:
In a free economy, the seller's freedom not to sell and the buyer's
freedom not to buy are both essential elements in the price-determining
process. In this context, the seller's right to refuse to sell is unqualified.
Deprived of this freedom, some other form of regulation would have to
be provided to protect the seller's right in his property.45
It is unquestionably true that a person owning property has the legal
right to sell it or keep it (subject to the principle of eminent domain)
for any reason or for no stated reason at all. Refusal to sell, as a busi-
ness practice, however, is not an attribute of private property rights.
It is rather a power to discriminate which rests upon a substantial
ownership of market supplies.
The basic market freedom of a seller is a freedom not to sell until
he can get his asking price. A buyer's basic freedom, moreover, is a
freedom not to buy except at his bid price. It is these freedoms which
are essential in the price-determining process. The declaration that
"The free market ideal long presupposed that a private merchant
could develop business relationships with whom he pleased" is only
partially true.46 In a free market, traders may and do select customers:
(1) by requiring cash or assured payment; (2) by stipulating the
purchase of a stated quantity, as a carload; (3) by selling to those
who offer the best bids; and (4) by refusing to sell except at their
42. Id. at 48.
43. Id. at 49.
44. COOLEY, TORTS 278 (1880).
45. Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA.
L. REV. 847, 849 (1955).
46. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAws 134 (1955).
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asking prices. Any other form of selection is not in accord with the
features of open markets as they actually operate in the American
economy.
Refusal to Sell and the Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act 47 condemns every conspiracy in re-
straint of trade or commerce, and the courts have consistently frowned
upon concerted refusals to sell. Collusion between a supplier and a
group of distributors, or coercion on a supplier by an association of
customers, to exclude or restrain a competitor, has also been typically
condemned.48
In the Times-Picayune case,49 the Court stated that "group boycotts,
or concerted refusals to deal, clearly run afoul of § 1 . . . [of the
Sherman Act]." And also in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,50
the Court declared that " [W]here a complaint charges that the defend-
ants . . . have concertedly refused to deal with non-members of an
association ... then the amount of commerce involved is immaterial
because such restraints are illegal per se."
Section 2 of the Sherman Act 51 is used mainly to condemn single-
seller monopoly power based upon control over all or a large part of
the supply of certain goods. Monopoly means the power to manage
price or to exclude competitors.5 2 It exists when a single seller of a
distinctive category of goods, or a sufficient number of sellers acting
as one on price, is able to establish or make the going price, or prices,
which as an actual fact, are largely observed in the industry. When
there is no rivalry on price, there is monopoly even though a dozen
firms are "competing" in the field for orders.
53
Private monopoly is a relative-not absolute-power. It is limited
by the presence of substitute products, as well as by freight costs. In
a broad sense, competition of some sort is universal and everywhere.
Always there are limits to the willingness of customers to continue
47. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
48. See, for example, decrees on refusal to sell in DECREES AND JUDGMENTS IN
CIVIL FEDERAL ANTITRUST CASES, JUNE 2, 1890 TO JANUARY 1, 1949. (1950) (Com-
piled by Mathew Miller and Angelo J. Maggio, Attorneys, Legal Procedure
Unit, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.).
49. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625
(1953).
50. 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
51. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
52. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946); United
States v. Aluminum Co., 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
53. Justice McKenna in National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129
(1905), described monopoly as "the suppression of competition by the unifica-
tion of interest or management, or it may be through agreement and concert
of action. And the purpose is so definitely the control of prices that monopoly
has been defined to be 'unified tactics with regard to prices.' It is the power
to control prices which makes the inducement of combinations and their




buying certain goods at higher prices. Substitute competition is an
important moderating force. It does not, however, prevent the placing
of undue burdens on the public. The presence of substitutes, therefore,
should not be taken to mean that a would-be buyer denied supplies can,
or must, find relief in substitute products.M If alternative supplies
are not equally fit to meet a buyer's needs, completely interchangeable
in use, there is not one market but two. The prohibition on monopoly
should be applied to a given market.
Monopoly power, moreover, is always relative to distance. There
is always an area of practical shipment, based upon mill prices and
actual delivery costs. Buyers in this area will not ordinarily change
their suppliers until local delivered costs are increased to the delivered
cost from distant production points. In considering refusal to sell,
therefore, it is essential to consider the alternatives of would-be buyers
in their area of practical supply.55
Remedies Under the Sherman Act
When a dominant seller controlling all or a large part of the supply
of certain goods engages in refusal to sell, the courts have provided
relief through injunctions, treble-damage settlements, or compulsory
selling decrees. The relief provided by compulsory-selling decrees
warrants much more study and publicity than have so far been given
in antitrust literature. Some of the more important decrees are listed
in Table I.
Table 156
Some Antitrust Judgments Which Contain
Compulsory-Selling Provisions
Civil Action or Date
Name of Case Decree Number Entered
United States v. Automatic Sprinkler Co. C.D. 46-C-1289 2-20-48
N.D. Ill.
United States v. General Electric Co. C.A. 26012 11-12-48
N.D. Ohio
United States v. American Can Co. C.A. 26345-H 6-22-50
N.D. Calif.
United States v. Continental Can Co. C.A. 26346
N.D. Calif. 6-26-50
United States v. Parke, Davis and Co. C.A. 8940 9-6-51
E.D. Mich.
54. See United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D.
Minn. 1945).
55. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n. 5 (1949).
Said Justice Frankfurter, "[T]he 'line of commerce' affected need not be
nationwide, at least where the purchasers cannot, as a practical matter, turn
to suppliers outside their own area."
56. Source: Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
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United States v. United Shoe Machinery C.A. 7198 2-18-53
Corp. D. Mass.
United States v. Western Newspaper C.A. 87-60 8-18-53
Union S.D. N.Y.
United States v. Providence Fruit and C.A. 1533 2-6-53
Produce, Inc. D. R.I.
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co. C.A. 6450 12-21-54
W.D. N.Y.
United States v. R. L. Polk C.A. 13135 3-16-55
E.D. Mich.
United States v. International Business C.A. 72-344 1-25-56
Machines Corp. S.D. N.Y.
A study of cases in which final judgments provide the relief of
compulsory selling indicates that this provision was granted (1) where
there is local market dominance by a given seller; (2) whenever there
are no realistic, alternative supplies of a standard product, inter-
changeable in use; (3) whenever the refusal to sell is being, or has
been, used to further a market position of control.
From the standpoint of public policy, compulsory-selling decrees
stand as a remedy not only for single-seller monopoly control, but
also for situations in which several large companies dominate an in-
dustry and "act as one" on refusal to sell (oligopoly), allegedly with-
out agreement. The condition of oligopoly, it would appear, can be
attacked (a) on the principle of implied conspiracy; or (b) as a condi-
tion of monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman Act on the grounds
that the larger companies jointly or collectively act to restrain trade
in refusing to sell standard products to nonintegrated fabricators.
The Need for Supplemental Measures to Remedy
the Economic Problem of Refusal to Sell
Section 2 of the Clayton Act and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, if vigorously enforced, undoubtedly would serve to clear up many
instances of refusal to sell. Action to provide relief on a case-by-case
basis for a complaint so widespread, however, would require far too
much time and money. The tangled status of judicial decisions on
refusal to sell also points to the need for legislation to reverse the
action of the courts in granting large corporations the right to exer-
cise the most aggravated form of discrimination by which small
business is restrained in competition with favored buyers. Basically,
the remedial measure needed is legislation by Congress requiring
producers of standard products who hold themselves out as dealing
with the public, and who control a substantial percentage of the output
in their area of practical shipment, to sell to all comers offering to
meet the publicly announced terms of sale. Such a statute, it is
believed, would be unquestionably legal upon the basis of the decision
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in Nebbia v. New York, 57 which declared the power of Congress to
regulate freedom on contract in the public interest.
In our present-day economy of large, integrated producers, acting
in the dual capacity of suppliers and competitors to independent
fabricators, and selling at prices administered by a market leader (or
leaders), it is clear that many problems of refusal to sell would not
be remedied by a general statute on compulsory selling. A common
complaint is that primary, integrated producers channel supplies of
basic products to their own fabricating subsidiaries in preference to
independents, particularly during periods of short supply. The grow-
ing extent to which large integrated producers are presently expanding
their own fabricating facilities also means that some independents are
being faced-or have been faced-with a complete foreclosure of the
market for basic products. One remedy which has been proposed for
these present day forms of supply denial is the proposal that large,
integrated producers shall be required to sell basic mill supplies,
after defense priorities are met, with first preference to bona fide
independent fabricators. The economic argument for such a proposal
is that when price does not operate freely in a competitive market to
allocate short supplies, some form of governmental intervention is
necessary to prevent favoritism, discrimination, and extortion.5 8
In a free-enterprise economy, it is essential for government to
maintain free and open markets for all standard commodities which
are used in further manufacturing, processing, and fabricating. Free-
dom of enterprise is based upon freedom of access to market supplies.
If specialized secondary, tertiary, and subsequent producers can be
assured of basic market supplies, the economy will be provided with
a wide choice of specialized products and a substantial measure of
protection from extortion through substitute competition. To insure
freedom of access to standard market supplies, it appears that funda-
mental studies also need to be made of the extent to which firsthand
producers should be permitted to control fabricating facilities which
are in competition with their customers. An inquiry which may find
growing interest is whether Congress should restrict corporate powers
to those which are essential for a single main purpose and kind of
business.
Restrictions Imposed in the Terms of Sale
Some enterprises appear to stand ready to sell to all comers but at
57. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
58. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Special Committee to Study the
Problems of American Small Business, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, at 840-42
and pt. 15, at 1744-45 (1947); Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee
on Small Business to Study Monopolistic Practices and Small Business, 82nd
Cong., 1st Sess., 21-31 (1952); House Select Committee on Small Business,
Small Business and the Aluminum Industry, H.R. Doc. No. 2954, 84th Cong.,
2d. Sess., 44-46 (1956).
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"terms of sale" which impose certain restraints. A condition fre-
quently imposed is that of observing stipulated resale prices. Although
the courts have curbed the practice of making agreements to maintain
stated resale prices, they appear to be willing to allow suppliers to
employ refusal to sell in disciplining distributors who act independ-
ently on price.5 9
The many complaints on supply denial by distributors who act
independently on price, as well as the time and expense involved in
attempting to learn the legal status of particular price-maintenance
plans, provide support for the Canadian practice of making it illegal
(a) to recommend minimum resale prices and (b) to refuse to sell,
to withdraw a franchise, or to use related means, to enforce minimum
resale prices.
A further economic problem which exists in relation to the terms
of sale is the practice of requiring a buyer to deal exclusively in the
supplier's line of products. Section 3 of the Clayton Act 6 condemns
tying contracts and exclusive-dealing arrangements which require
that a lessee or purchaser "shall not use or deal in the goods . . of a
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect...
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce." The word "substantially," however, is
not defined in the law, and the decisions of the courts provide no
clear-cut rule on the degree of restraint which stands condemned.61
A number of recent decisions also indicate that section 3 of the
Clayton Act can be evaded by the technique of refusing to sell. In-
stead of making outright contracts on exclusive-dealing arrangements,
suppliers have been able to achieve the same results (1) by refusing
to sell to dealers who handle competing lines of merchandise or (2) by
cutting off dealers who refuse to accept an exclusive-dealer franchise.
Thus, according to the majority opinion in the Motorola case, "a review
of all the cases decided by the Supreme Court involving Section 3 of
the Clayton Act, reveals that in each of them there was an agreement
and not a mere refusal to deal. There is a real difference between the
act of refusing to deal and the execution of a contract which prevents
a person from dealing with another. '62
Available evidence indicates that tying and exclusive-dealing ar-
rangements are widely used in business to the detriment and dis-
advantage of small business. 63 It is quite possible that many of the
59. See Adams-Mitchel Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., 189 F.2d 913, 916
(2d Cir. 1951). Note the dissenting opinion by Judge Frank, id. at 917.
60. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952).
61. See United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
62. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1952). See also Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946); Camfield
Mfg. Co. v. McGraw Elec. Co., 70 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1947).
63. See House Select Committee on Small Business, Monopolistic and Unfair
Trade Practices, H.R. Doc. No. 2464, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-9 (1948).
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plans are illegal. The time and cost of prosecuting a supplier, however,
are a serious barrier to relief. The courts themselves, moreover, give
suppliers a considerable range of immunity in accepting refusals to
sell. If the essential purpose of the Clayton Act is to be realized, it
appears that it will be necessary for Congress to make it illegal per se
for a seller controlling a substantial amount of the sales in his area of
practical shipment, and holding himself out as selling to the public,
(1) to use or employ tying and exclusive-dealing arrangements as a
condition for selling, or continuing to sell, a given product; or (2) to
refuse to sell, or threaten to refuse to sell, to dealers who handle
competing lines of merchandise or who refuse to accept an exclusive-
dealer franchise.
The Selection of Dealers and Refusal to Sell
A final problem which needs to be considered in formulating com-
pulsory-selling legislation is the practice of some suppliers to select
certain dealers and to refuse to sell to others. This practice exists
mainly in the distribution of specialized products for sale to final
consumers (e.g., silverware) or for sale to final customers (e.g., farm
machinery). Criteria used for dealer selections include credit rating;
the dealer's past behavior as a "price cutter"; "well-established" posi-
tion in the trade; the dealer's willingness to deal exclusively with the
supplier; and the financial ability to maintain a repair or service
department.
Usually, a supplier formalizes his selection of a dealer by granting
a franchise or other form of sales contract. Thereupon, if the supplying
firm decides that a selected dealer is failing to comply with the pattern
of distribution desired, it is likely to cancel the franchise and refuse
to sell.
A sizable number of the complaints on refusal to sell arise in the
practice of cancelling franchises and in refusing to grant franchises.
It is recognized that suppliers may have a very proper interest in
securing efficient distributors and in avoiding a proliferation of un-
economic outlets in particular sales areas. The complaints of many
dealers reveal, however, that franchises are frequently cancelled
because of favoritism, pressure from other dealers, or a failure to
observe resale prices or exclusive-dealing arrangements.
As a remedial measure for the evils of discrimination, favoritism,
and restraint of trade which sometimes arise in present-day franchise
arrangements, it is proposed that legislation be enacted to provide
basic conditions for use in franchise agreements. As a further feature,
it is proposed that this legislation should contain a provision requiring
any manufacturer of a given product in final form for consumer use,
or for sale to final customers, who is a substantial producer of that
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product in his area of practical shipment, to sell to any dealer who
meets the publicly-announced terms of sale.
Summary
In summary, it may be said that the business practice of refusal to
sell is not a basic attribute of private property or the rights of free
citizens. It is not, moreover, a free-market ideal nor an essential ele-
ment in the price-making process. As used by persons in business,
holding themselves out as dealing with the public, refusal to sell is a
form of discrimination practiced by a seller (or unified group of
sellers) having some degree of monopoly power. Refusal to sell
typically means a refusal to sell some persons, offering to meet the
terms of sale, at the same time that sales are being made in the same
market to other buyers. Refusal to sell rests upon a control over such
a large proportion of the market supply of certain goods that a net
gain can be made by denying supplies to some persons. Since the
would be buyers denied supplies do not have realistic, sufficiently
available, alternative sources of supply, completely interchangeable
in use, they are restrained in competition with those who are able
to buy. The favored buyers thereupon gain by being able to sell at
higher prices because some competition has been excluded. The usual
effect and result of refusal to sell are to restrain the trade of the
persons denied supplies in relation to those to whom the goods are sold.
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